Comparative Advantage and the Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment by HOON, Hian Teck
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
11-1991
Comparative Advantage and the Equilibrium Rate
of Unemployment
Hian Teck HOON
Singapore Management University, hthoon@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90226-b
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Industrial Organization Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HOON, Hian Teck. Comparative Advantage and the Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment. (1991). Economics Letters. 37, (3), 299-304.
Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/174
Economics Letters 37 (1991) 299-304 
North-Holland 
299 
Comparative advantage and 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment * 
Hian Teck Hoon 
Nutronul Umrwsity of Singuporr, Singapore, MI I 
Received 15 May 1991 
Accepted 22 July I091 
This paper develops a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model with endogenous equilibrium involuntary unemployment to 
examine the question: Wat is the effect of free trade on the equilibrium rates of unemployment in the laborabundant and 
labor-scarce countries’? It is shown that free trade leads to a decline in the equilibrium rate of unemployment in the 
labor-abundant country but to a ri.se in unemployment in the labor-scarce country. 
1. Introduction 
It is a well-documented fact that the East-Asian Newly Industrializing Countries’ growth 
experience through the sixties and seventies relied upon the exports of labor-intensive manufac- 
tures. One significant aspect of their economic development is the improvement of employment 
conditions. Fields (1985) documents that the rates of unemployment around the early sixties were 
about 8 percent in South Korea, 6 percent in Taiwan, and 9 percent in Singapore ‘. In contrast, at 
the beginning of the eighties South Korea’s unemployment rate was 4.1 percent, Taiwan’s was 1.3 
percent and Singapore’s was 3.1 percent. Fields’ own explanation for the impressive employment 
performance in the NIEs is that the export-led growth in all these countries was of a labor-intensive 
character. 
While the empirical facts suggest that international trade helped alleviate the unemployment 
problems of the NICs, standard pure trade theory by assuming full-employment at the outset does 
not provide an explanation for the link between trade and equilibrium unemployment. This paper 
sets up a two-country general equilibrium Heckscher-Ohlin model to examine the relationship 
between trade based upon comparative advantage and the equilibrium rate of unemployment *. We 
demonstrate that free trade leads to a decline in the equilibrium rate of unemployment in the 
labor-abundant country but to a rise in unemployment in the labor-scarce country. The model that 
* This paper is based upon my dissertation sumbitted to Columbia University. I wish to thank. without implicating, 
Professors John Donaldson, Ronald Findlay, Glenn Hubbard, and Edmund Phelps for useful discussions and comments. 
’ No reliable data are available for Hong Kong for the sixties. However, unemployment rates were high in the early 
seventies and subsequently declined in the early eighties. 
’ Other papers which examine the problem of trade and equilibrium unemployment include Brecher (19901, Bulow and 
Summers (1986). and Copeland (1989). The first two papers consider small, open economies while the last develops a 
two-country Ricardian model. 
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we develop also throws light on the incentives for protection in the import-competing sector of the 
advanced economies. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we prove the proposition on free trade and the 
natural rate of unemployment in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. We discuss applications of the 
model in section 3. 
2. Free trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin two-country world 
2.1. The basic shirking model in autarkJ 
There are N workers in the closed economy with each worker being risk neutral, and having the 
utility function ~4.) = c -e where c = c:c(~“, 0 < n < 13. Here c,, c,, are the consumptions of 
goods X and Y, respectively, and e is the effort level. e can take only two values, zero if no effort is 
supplied (when the worker shirks) and positive, otherwise. The worker is indifferent between 
working in either sector so that, in equilibrium, real wages will be equalized across sectors ‘. In 
addition, we assume that the worker owns a non-produced factor called ‘land’ which provides him a 
source of non-labor income. 
Each worker maximizes the expected present value of utility, V, with a subjective discount rate 
equal to p. We first consider the decision problem of a worker whether or not to shirk when he is 
employed 5. Let I(,,, V,,,, denote the expected present value of utility in the case when he shirks and 
when he does not. By solving a simple dynamic programming problem, we can show that y,, and 
y.,, satisfy the following fundamental asset equations: 
pl’ =~(u,+rT)p-“~“‘+(/~+s)(V,,-~,,)+~,,, (‘5 (I) 
P L =@(w+rT)p-“-“-e+h(l/;,-y.,,)+li, ,,,. (2) 
In eqs. (1) and (2), /, is the subjective discount rate; h is the separation rate (due to exogenous 
reasons other than shirking) and is the same for all firms; and g is the probability of being caught if 
shirking (also exogenous). p,, and I’,.,, represent the time derivatives of y,, and l(,,,, respectively. 
@CM’ + rT)f.‘- (‘pri) is the worker’s indirect utility function with @ being a positive constant “. Here /
p is the relative price of good Y in terms of good X (the numeraire good); w is the real wage, v is 
the rental rate and T is the quantity of land owned by the worker, assuming that land is divided 
equally among workers. 
In order for it not to be worthwhile for the worker to shirk, it is necessary that V,,, 5 l(,,,. There 
is, however, no reason for the firm to pay more than necessary to prevent shirking. Thus, we have 
the condition 
y., = y,,,. v’t. (3) 
’ In general. our results carry through for any c which is homothetic. 
’ This assumption is in contrast to that made in Bulow and Summers (1986) where the concern is with optimal trade policy 
in the context of equilibrium inter-industry MYJ~C di/~~wcwrru/s. Our argument here is that cwn when real wages are 
equalized across wztors. there may be a role for trade policy in the presence of involuntary unemployment. 
5 Following Kimball (IWU). we allow for dynamics in the shirking behavior of workers. 
” As in Shapiro-Stiglitz (lW4). it is implicitly assumed that the worker is unable to borron or lend. 
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(4) 
and hence 
Using eqs. (3) and (4), we can combine eqs. (1) and (2) to yield 
(5) 
Since g and e are constant, we also have 
r’,, = r;;,, vt. (6) 
The expected discounted value of utility for an unemployed worker must obey the asset 
equation: 
pv, = @(rT)p-‘I-7)+a(l/;,, - v,,) + I;I,, (7) 
where a is the accession rate, the rate at which the unemployed gain employment. Notice from eq. 
(7) that the worker continues to own income from rents even though he is unemployed, giving rise 
in this case to the indirect utility function @(rT)p- (‘pv) Substituting eqs. (5) and (6) into eq. (7), . 
and after some manipulations, we obtain 
(8) 
using the fact that out of steady state, the accession rate can be expressed as 
(i +bL) 
a= 
N-L . 
(9) 
Eq. (8) is our aggregate no-shirking constraint (NSC) which says that the higher the rate of 
employment, and thus the shorter the expected time spent in unemployment if fired, the more 
tempting it is to shirk. To avoid this, firms must pay a higher real wage ‘. The NSC in this model 
takes the place of the labor supply curve in the standard model of the labor market - our 
pseudo-labor supply curve. 
Turning now to the demand side of the model, we assume that the production functions are, in 
general, given by X = L,f,(k,) and Y = L,f,(k,) where f,’ > 0 and f,” < 0 so that we have 
constant returns to scale. k,, k, are the sectoral land-labor ratios; and L,, L, are the labor 
allocated to sectors X and Y, respectively. We assume that sector Y is relatively more capital- 
intensive and rule out any factor-intensity reversals. Under these assumptions, it is convenient to 
’ Notice that the NSC does not depend upon the rental rate offered by firms in the economy. This result depends upon the 
assumption of homothetic tastes and the fact that workers obtain their rental income whether they are employed or not. 
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work with the Cobb-Douglas form given by X = L, ky and I’= L,.kf. The demand for labor and 
land by each firm gives rise to eqs. (10) and (11): 
w=(l -a)k:‘=p(l-p)ktj. 
r =ak.y-’ =pfIkt? 
( ‘0) 
(“1 
(‘2) 
(‘3) 
where CY, p lie between zero and one, and p > cy. Using eqs. (10) and (1 l), we may derive 
W 
_ = lpp”-cy) 
r 
where ‘If is a positive constant. Eq. (12) is a statement of the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem. 
To close the model, we also need the conditions that the total sectoral labor allocation be eqal to 
the aggregate employment, land be fully employed, and the goods markets clear. Thus, we have 
L,+L?=N(L/N), ( 14) 
X_,L,+k,.L,=NT. ( 15) 
c,/c,. =X/Y, (16) 
where C,/C,. = n/[(l - n)p-‘] and 
T[(L/N)T-‘(w/r)“- (1 -/3)/L-‘(~/r)~(‘~“)] 
x’y- [(1 -cu)a-‘(w/T)~+‘)- (L/N)T-‘(w/r)‘] ’ 
with I‘ being a positive constant. 
The autarkic equilibrium is summarized in fig. 1. The equilibrium relative price p- ’ is 
determined at point Ej, in the lefthand quadrant of Figure 1. Projecting this on the NSC in the 
righthand quadrant of Figure 1, we obtain the corresponding rate of unemployment, 1 - (L / Njj;,,. 
2.2. Proof of proposition on free trade and unemployment 
We call the two countries Asia and America and assume that they are completely identical 
except for relative factor endownments ‘. The latter is defined in terms of the ratio of the total 
endownment of the non-produced factor (land) to the total labor force. We make the following 
assumption: Asia is relatively labor abundant whereas America is relatively labor scarce. Thus, 
T*>T, (17) 
where T is the amount of land per unit of the labor force in Asia. (An asterisk is used to denote an 
’ This assumption will lead to an equalization of the natural rates of unemployment under free trade. 
NSC I 
cx/cy,x/Y,x’/Y’,(x+x’)/O 0 (L/N);, (L/Njf (L/N);m 
Fig. I. Effects of trade on unemployment. 
American variable.) Under this assumption, X/Y > X*/Y * in autarky. Combined with the 
assumption of identical and homothetic tastes, and the conditions that C,/C, = X/Y and C,“/C,T 
=X*/Y * must hold in autarky, it is easily seen that p-’ is lower in Asia than in America, that is, 
the relative price of the labor-intensive good is lower in Asia in autarky. It follows from the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem that the real wage is lower in Asia. From the NSCs, it can be easily 
checked that 1 - (L/N);, > 1 - (L/N)j,,,, that is, in autarky, America experiences a lower rate of 
unemployment. 
With free trade, Asia will be a net-exporter of the relatively labor-intensive good. What is the 
impact of opening up to free trade on the natural rates of unemployment in both America and 
Asia? With completely free trade, both economies face the same terms of trade (which lies between 
the two autarky terms of trade), and has the same rate of unemployment given by 1 - (L/N )‘. The 
following inequality holds: 1 - (L/N);,, > 1 - (L/N)’ > 1 - (L/N )$,,,. Thus, free trade leads to 
employment gains for Asia but employment losses for America. The paths taken by Asia and 
America toward the new free-trade equilibrium are also shown in fig. 1. 
3. Discussion of model 
3. I. Welfure effects qf trade 
The welfare of a representative worker can be expressed as his expected utility which depends 
upon the probability of being employed. It is given by (L/N )@wp -(’ -?) + @(rT)p-(’ -7). Using the 
fact that WL + rNT =X + pY, we can show that the change in the expected utility of a worker 
d(Eu) = [-(C,. - Y)dp + (dX+pdY)]/N. 
The first term gives us the usual gains from terms of trade improvement while the second term 
indicates the shift in the production possibilities curve resulting from trade ‘). For Asia, the second 
term is positive (since free trade leads to a lower unemployment rate and hence an outward shift of 
the transformation curve) but it is negative for America since free trade raises unemployment. 
3.2. Incentil~es for protection 
It is straightforward to check that, absent the Metzler paradox, an import quota or a tariff 
imposed by the labor-scarce country raises domestic employment through raising real wages and 
moving upward along the NSC. Neutral technical progress in the export sector of the labor-abun- 
dant countries and the entrance of the Newly Exporting Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand 
as major exporters of labor-intensive manufactures will have the effect of raising incentives to lobby 
for protection to save jobs in the labor-scarce countries as real wages are driven down in the latter! 
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